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PAMELA L. CAUGHIE teaches
twentieth-century literature and
theory at Loyola University, Chicago. She is author of Virginia

Unlike the stereotypical feminist model that suggests women best come to voice
in an atmosphere of safety .. ., I encourage students to work ... in an atmosphere where they may be afraid or see themselves at risk.

bell hooks, TalkingBack

Woolf and Postmodernism(U of
Illinois P 1991) and is completing the manuscript of a book,

Passing and Pedagogy:The Dynamics of Responsibility (U of
Illinois P), which includes a version of this essay. Another version of the essay will appear in

In Other Words:Feminism and
Composition Studies, edited by
Susan C. Jarratt and Lynn Worsham (MLA,forthcoming).

HIS ESSAY attempts to intervene theoretically and pragmatically at a critical moment in our profession, when literary studies in colleges and universities across the United States is increasingly
becoming culture studies.' This transformation over the past two decades
in the social, philosophical, and political bases of the humanities is due
partly to the academy's efforts to acknowledge diversity, by institutionalizing multiculturalism and various "studies programs" (women's studies, gay studies, ethnic studies, composition studies) in response to the
influx of nontraditional students since the early 1970s, and partly to
poststructuralism's efforts to theorize difference and to destabilize the
very categories of identity on which those studies programs are founded.
Such programs, particularly women's studies, have traditionally been
devoted to a humanist concept of the subject as "source and agent of
conscious action or meaning" (P. Smith xxxiii-xxxiv) and committed to
opening this subject position to previously marginalized groups. In contrast, poststructuralist theories, including some feminist theories, have
revealed the humanist subject to be a sham insofar as it is the effect, not
the origin, of representation. As this essay suggests, when antifoundational theories that deconstruct the self converge with studies programs
that revive it, anxiety arises over the positions we find ourselves in as
scholars and teachers in the newly configured university.2
Culture studies would seem to offer a pedagogy for working through
the tensions between these two perspectives on the subject since issues
of identity formation and of subject position are central not only to its
object of study but to its method of inquiry. Culture studies has shifted
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the focus of literarystudiesfrom interpreting,transmitting, or preserving individual texts considered
representative of particularcultures to analyzing
cultureas a historicallyspecific ensemble of social
practices and signifying systems that provide, in
Mary Poovey's words, "the terms through which
humansunderstandour world [and]from which we
derive our identity" ("Criticism"618). Given that
the reading,writing,and teachingwe do as academics partially constitute the cultural formations it
seeks to interrogate, culture studies necessarily
takes the work of teachersand scholarsas one of its
objects of scrutiny.Concerned with "the complex
ways in which identity itself is articulated,experienced, anddeployed"(Nelson, Treichler,andGrossberg 9) and with the "politics of location"(Faigley
218), culturestudiesrequiresits practitioners"toinclude in their critical view the conditions of their
own existence" at the same time that it identifies
itself "polemically with certain social constituencies"-for instance,blacks,women, workers(Bathrick 323-25). The classroombecomes a site of both
culturalinterventionand continualself-critique.To
practice culture studies, as Susan Rubin Suleiman
writes in anothercontext, "is to implicateyourself,
yourself, in whatyou write"(2) andwhatyou teach.
Yet however strong, however sincere, our commitment as literature professors to certain social
constituencies and to continual self-critique, when
ethnicity becomes "the new frontier,accessible to
all" (hooks, Yearning52), when men become feminists and straights become queer, when African
Americanstudies and women's studiesbecome culturalstudies, when a prominentfeminist can write,
"I began to wonderwhetherthere was any position
from which a white middle-classfeministcould say
anythingon the subject [of race] without sounding
exactly like [a white middle-class feminist].... In
which case it might be better not to say anything"
(Miller, "Criticizing"364)-something, it seems,
has gone wrong. The practitionersof culture studies experience a double bind in which the desireindeed,the imperative-to speakas or for members
of a particularsocial group conflicts with the anxieties such a practiceevokes.The writerwho deliberately assumesanother'spositionrisksbeing accused
of unconsciouslydoing so.3
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In recentwritings,I have deployedthe termpassing to describeour subjectpositions in postmodern
culture and by extension in a culture studies paradigm.4Passing traditionallyrefersto the practiceof
representingoneself-for social, economic, or political reasons-as a memberof a particulargroup
not consideredone's own. Historically,the practice
is mainly, though not exclusively, associated with
the assumptionof a white identityby light-skinned
AfricanAmericans.Passing is generallyimplicated
in a racist social organization.The painful psychic
consequencesof passing attestedto in many narratives are corporeally depicted in Agnieszka Holland's 1991film Europa,Europa,basedon Solomon
Perel's autobiography,in which the protagonist,a
GermanJew, tries to conceal his identity from his
Nazi companions by pulling what remains of his
foreskinover the tip of his penis andtying it in place
with a piece of thread.
In its traditionalsense, passing often carriespejorative connotationsof deception, dishonesty,and
betrayal.5When used as a metaphor,with the operative as, the termcan applyto situationsin which one
engages in impersonationfor the purposeof fraud.
But in my use, passing (withoutthe as) figuresthe
always slippery difference between standingfor
something (having a firm position) and passing
as something (having no position or a fraudulent
one), between the strategic adoption of a politically empoweredidentity(e.g., when blackspass as
white) and the disempowering appropriationof a
potentially threateningdifference (e.g., when men
pass as feminist), and between what one professes
as a teacher(the positions one assumesin the classroom, often speaking for another) and how one is
positioned in a society, an institution,a discourse,
or a classroom. Marking a discrepancy between
what one professes to be (and what one professes,
as a writer or teacher) and how one is positioned,
passing is risky business-but, as this essay professes, unavoidable. For there is no occupying a
position without passing. Thus I offer passing not
as a solution to the double bind I outlined above
but as a descriptivetheoryof its dynamics.
Unlike the more common notions of speakingas
and speaking for, passing disrupts subject positions. The difference between these two ways of
conceptualizingthe problemis highlightedby two
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sentences that appear on the same page of Linda
Alcoff's "The Problem of Speaking for Others,"
which analyzes many of the issues and impasses I
confront in this essay. For Alcoff, the problem of
speaking for arises from the recognition that the
"positionality"of the speaker"bearson" the meaning and truthof what the speaker says (an insight
that women's studies and AfricanAmericanstudies
programs were founded on) and that some privileged locations are "discursively dangerous" no
matterwhat the speaker'sintentions(6-7).6 Realizing the dangers but opposing a retreat from the
practice of speaking for, Alcoff offers imperatives
for ensuring that speakers' representationsof others are responsible. The primaryinjunctionis that
speakersmust interrogatethe effects of their social
locations on what they say (24-26).
Alcoff's insistence on self-critique combines a
materialistfocus on specific locations with a postmodernistunderstandingof the discursive character of subjectivity. The "mediatedcharacterof all
representations" (9) is acknowledged in the two
sentences I wantto compare:
a possible
WhenI speakformyself,I amconstructing
self, a way to be in the world, and am offering that to
others,whetherI intendto or not, as one possible way
to be.
When I "speak for myself" I am participatingin the
creationand reproductionof discoursesthroughwhich
(21)
my own and otherselves are constituted.
Alcoff seems to be saying much the same thing
in these two sentences, yet the quotation marks
around "speak for myself" in the second make the
(dia)critical difference. In the first sentence, the I
takes for granted that it can speak for itself, that it
can occupy a subject position, that there even are
subject positions one can occupy, however selfconsciously. In the second sentence, the I is performative, constituted in and through speaking, the act
of invoking an I. The second sentence reveals the
I of the first and the subject of Alcoff's imperatives
to be a seduction of grammar (Butler, Bodies 6).
The one who writes the first sentence forgets the I
of the second, writing as if one could be immune to
the effects of performance.7

The impasse between Alcoff's two sentences
gives rise to the structural dynamics that I term
passing. The slippage between the volitional and
the performativesubject makes passing inevitable
whenever any I claims to speak for itself.8 Even if
as teachers and critics of culture studies we acknowledge our social locations as multipleand unstable, shaped by specific histories and subject to
various representationaltechnologies, we always
talk of subject positions and self-critique as if we
were immune to performanceand therebyresuscitate in practice(in grammar)the subjectwe dismantle in theory. In this sense, as Mas'ud Zavarzadeh
and Donald Morton argue (15-16), the practice of
writingitself may resist the radicalinsights of postmodern theories, putting us all in the position of
passing when we speak for ourselves and others.
Passing is neither something one does (as in performinga role) nor somethingone is (a subjectposition we must account for) but a way of naming
and conceptualizingan interpersonal,psychopolitical dynamics that for many of us structuresthe experience of reading, teaching, and writing about
literaturetoday.9Passing is not always and only a
volitional act that an already positioned subject
chooses to engage in. Passing happens,and it happens despite, or more often because of, our sincere
efforts to get it right.'?
In this essay, I engage performativelywith culturalandpedagogicaldebatesover the natureof the
subjectby workingthroughthe dynamicsof passing
exemplified in a particularexchange on this issue
among feminists, in two student responses to the
1934 film Imitation of Life, and in Fannie Hurst's
novel that inspiredthe film. My purposeis not only
to arguefor a performativeconceptof the I but also,
and more important,to show that taking a certain
position on the subject-whether as feminists, culturalcritics, or literatureteachers-is not the same
as acceptingresponsibilityfor the subjectpositions
we assume and put into play in the classroom.
The Subject in Feminism
The question of womenas the subject of feminism raises
the possibility that theremay not be a subjectwho stands
"before"the lavwawaitingrepresentationin or by the law.
JudithButler,GenderTrouble
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Two prominent debates among feminists in the
1990s have centeredon the viabilityof postmoder
theories for feminist politics and on the political
implications of the use white feminists make, in
their writing and teaching, of black women's texts.
These debates are not unrelated, since black and
white feministsalike have accusedsome white feminists of exploiting the "fracturedpublic identities" (Berlant 121) of African Americanwomen to
promote a new postmodern subjectivity.Whereas
twenty years ago white feminists were accused
(fairly) of ignoringblack women's writingsand experiences in their theories, today they are accused
of turningto black women's writingsand bodies to
rereferentializeor rematerializean increasinglyabstractand disengagedtheoreticalfeminism.Twenty
years ago, before the institution of culture studies
in the United States academy,one of two mutually
exclusive responsesto these chargesof neglect prevailed: to add the particularoppressions faced by
black women to a universaland liberationisttheory
of genderoppressionor to admit,as PatriciaMeyer
Spacks did in The FemaleImagination,thata white
middle-class woman could not theorize about experiences she had not had (see Carby, ch. 1). In
contrast,contemporaryculturalcritics, who problematize the very boundariesof social identitieson
which such responses rested, are more likely to attend to "the operations of race in the feminine"
(Abel 471). Today we hearless aboutthe failureof
the (white) female imaginationto projectitself into
unfamiliarexperiences than about the exposure of
white (female) desires in thatvery effort-to speak
as or for black women.
Two recentarticlesby white feministcriticsdemonstratenot only the requirementof culturestudies
that we speak on behalf of certain social constituencies while engaging in self-critique but also the
double bind created by this imperative. Margaret
Homans in "'Womenof Color' Writersand Feminist Theory"and ElizabethAbel in "BlackWriting,
White Reading: Race and the Politics of Feminist
critiquewhite feminists'use of black
Interpretation"
women's texts and are, to differing degrees, selfconscious, indeed nervous, about the double bind
of theirown positions as white feministcritics writing on black women's texts. Togetherthese essays

provide a pretext for analyzing the dynamics of
passing in culturalcriticismandcriticalpedagogy."
Homanscriticizes certainfeminists (Diana Fuss,
Donna Haraway,and JudithButler)for appropriating texts by "women of color" (Homans'sterm) to
figure a postmoderntheory of subjectivitythat critiques "bodily or biological based theories of gender"andidentity(82). Citingonly the "postmodern"
aspectsof the texts they appropriate,these theorists,
Homanscharges,downplaythe texts' ambivalence.
They ignore that the works in fact position themselves on both sides of the identitydebate,invoking
a naturalor alreadyexisting identity and revealing
an awarenessthat such an identityis always "in the
processof being made"(79). Homansrevaluesthese
texts' naturalizing tendencies, the ways in which
"womenof color"reclaimthemselves as embodied
subjects.The texts promotea concept of identityas
embodiment:they constructthe black female body
as natural (86). To use these texts as examples
of postmodern theories of the subject, which for
Homans are theories of disembodiment,is to deny
the texts' claim to the naturalwhile reembodying
theories of dis-embodiment, making "women of
color"do the culturalworkthey have alwaysdonenamely,embodyingthe body for white culture(73).
As an example, Homans contrasts treatments
of SojournerTruthby Donna Harawayand Alice
Walker.Harawayurgesus to be like SojournerTruth,
who becomes in heressay a figurefor a "nongeneric,
nonoriginal humanity" (qtd. in Homans 78). For
Haraway, Homans says, the body of the black
woman is a "resourcefor metaphor"(77). Walker,
in contrast, achieves a "personal identification"
with SojournerTruth,claiming to be her. Whereas
Haraway'sfigurativelanguage is "an alibi for dematerializingthe [black] female body"(78), Walker's identificationis a way of (re)claimingthatbody.
In Homan'sreading,Walkerand Truthstandbefore
the law (of representation),bearingan unmediated
relation to the black female body-embodying it
naturally,as if theiridentitywere so close to nature
that it did not pass throughthe filterof culturaldiscourses, those "powerfulinstitutionalizedrhetorics
thatprovidethe termsin which to representthe self
as a subjectin relationto others"(Brodkey,"Pedagogy" 138). Yet the ambivalence Homans notices
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in black women's writingswould also suggest these
writers'recognitionof the filter.
Abel's critique of BarbaraJohnson follows the
same lines as Homans's reading of Haraway and
Butler. Johnson ignores in Zora Neale Hurston's
writings "a possible belief in, or desire for belief
in, a black identity,"Abel argues,because Johnson
understands race as rhetorical rather than literal
(480). For Johnson, representationsof a black essence operate within "specific interlocutionarysituation[s]" and are "mattersof strategy ratherthan
truth" (qtd. in Abel 480). By dereferentializing
race, Abel says, Johnsondisplaces "a discourse on
race" with "a discourse on positionality," a move
that enables the white deconstructionistto write as
the black novelist. By as, Abel means not only "in
the manner of" (for she has just compared Johnson's and Hurston'stechniquesof framingtheiressays) but also "in the subject position of." For if
race is simply a matterof figuration,a white critic
can assume the position of a black writer.Drawing
on Johnson's critique of male philosophers who
position themselvesas women, Abel points out that
Johnson,while capable of positioning herself philosophically as a black woman,cannotbe positioned
politically as black. Failing to make this distinction, Johnson risks "dislocating race from historically accreteddifferencesin power"(482-83).
Homans and Abel demonstrateeffectively that
adopting a certain theoretical position on the subject (in this case, a reputedly postmodernistposition) is not the same as taking responsibility for
one's own subjectposition as enactedin one's writing, and to this extent they advanceone argumentI
am makingaboutpassing.And both reveal,to recall
Abel's phrase, "the operationsof race in the feminine." But what interests me are the solutions Homans and Abel present to the problem of writing
across racial differences, the ways in which they
try to save themselves, as well as (white) feminist
criticism, from exposing themselves-that is, from
passing in the pejorativesense.
Accordingto Homans,the "culturalproblematic"
in white feminist writings on black women's texts
is both"aproblemof race relationsin the academy"
and partof "thewidespreaddebateover the uses of
postmodernisttheoryfor feministpoliticalpractice"

(76). The troublingquestion, as Homans acknowledges, is whether this cultural problematicauthorizes or invalidates (or both) her position in her
essay.While Homansneverexplicitly returnsto this
question, she implies an answer. She comes close
to suggesting (as does Nancy Miller in the remark
cited above) that white feminists should have nothing to do with-or at least do nothing with-the
writing of "women of color."Ironically, since she
uses such writing,this argumentwould put Homans
in the position of passing as black. But the difference betweenHomansandthe feminists she attacks
lies not in the fact that they use black women's
writingsto defend theirpositions on the subjectbut
in the positions they take. As Abel points out, for
Homans all women share the culturalcondition of
embodiment, which is devalued because the symbolic register(figuration)dependson the exclusion
of "thefemale (maternal)body" (literalness)(484).
Thus, it is precisely the construction of the black
female body as naturalthat not only makes Alice
Walker's claim to (be) Truthtenable but also enables Homans to represent a theory of embodied
subjectivitythroughWalkerwhile at the same time
savingherself from her own criticismof white feminists who use black women to embody their theories. Homans exonerates herself from her racially
charged accusations against others by claiming to
use black women's figures of embodimentinstead
of making the women figures for her position on
embodiment(whichhappensto coincidewiththeirs).
Yet Homans'seffort to reclaim or reliteralizethe
black woman'sbody, as she questions"thepolitical
utility of argumentsthat dissociate feminism from
the body" (87), does not save her from charges of
appropriationbut implicates her in an instance of
passing far more audacious than the examples she
cites. Characterizingpostmodernfeminists as the
exploitative white mistress whose work is done by
black women, Homans casts herself in the role of
the domestic. As she puts it, black women in her
essay "are working . . . for themselves at least as

much as for me. Perhapsit could even be said thatI
am workingfor them"(88). The rhetoricof domestic service serves Homans's interests in the same
way she claims black women's historically constituted identities serve postmodernfeminists' inter-
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ests. The rhetorical gesture allows her to pass not
only as the domestic(workingfor others)but also as
a black woman, speaking as and for black women
in the pages of New Literary History and in this

feminist debate over the subject.In the name of reclaiming embodiment,Homansembodies another's
position and then uses that figurativeposition to attack a theory of figuration.The rhetoricof her assertion is incompatible with its explicit meaning,
andher performance(herassumptionof an identity)
comes into conflict with the identity she would assume (take for granted).
I do not mean to deny the value of Homans'sessay, especially in its attention to the writings of
black feminist theorists. Rather, my point is that
thereis in the essay an incompatibilitybetween her
rhetoricand her meaning, her performanceand her
theory.This is, I argue, a function of the dynamics
that I have identified as inherent in the cultural
problematicthatHomans sees as the problemto be
resolved.Failingto interrogatehow this problematic
inflects her writing (the ways in which she may be
passing),Homansdisplacesthe generalfear thatthe
essence of feminism (not just a shared concept of
womanbut also the idea thatwomen sharethe same
positions) is at risk in postmodernitywith the more
specific anxiety that "women of color" are being
denied the opportunityto representthemselves because whitefeministshaveunfairaccess to the means
of representing theory in the academy and unfair
access to "race"as, in hooks's words,"thenew frontier."'2 I do not refute this specific claim, but I
questionthe effort to get out of this structureby reclaimingthe body in the nameof "womenof color."
In calling for "thick descriptions"as a more viable feminist practice (496) and in engaging the
writingsof feministsof differenttheoreticalpersuasions, Abel at least potentiallydirectsher attention
to feminist criticism as an institutionratherthan to
a particularkind of feminism. Analyzing the work
of Homans,Johnson,and SusanWillis, Abel argues
that no matterwhat theoretical position they take,
their readings across racial lines are marked by
white desires. Comparing Johnson and Homans,
Abel writes that whereas"privilegingthe figurative
enables the white reader[Johnson]to achieve figurativeblackness"(to speak as), "privilegingthe literal enables the white woman reader [Homans] to
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forge a gender alliance" across race (to speak for)
(485). Black and white writersmeet in sharedfigurality for Johnson;black and white women meet in
sharedliterality for Homans. Both feminists, Abel
continues,use black women to legitimatetheirown
positions, and for both, race is "a salient source of
fantasiesandallegiancesthatshape"white women's
reading of black women's writing (486, 497). All
these efforts to read across racial lines are for Abel
forms of passing, and in the end, all passing fails
because "ourinability to avoid inscribing racially
inflectedinvestmentsand agendaslimits white feminism's capacity either to impersonateblack feminism, and potentially render it expendable, or to
counter its specific credibility" (497). Instead of
deflecting these racial investments onto particular
feminists,Abel calls for a particularpracticeamong
white feminists readingblack women's writing:to
provide"thickdescriptions"of black women's texts
and to engage in continualself-critique.
In the opening of her essay, Abel practices selfcritique,embarrassinglyexposing her own "racially
specific investments"in her readingof Toni Morrison's story "Recitatif."For Abel, self-critique depends on confession, and the confessional I is the
guilty I. This I-whether Abel's or Nancy Miller's
or Descartes's-responds to the anxiety of finding
thatthe I is not what it thinks(i.e., thatit is a fraud)
by tryingto masterthe self, hailing us rightback to
the Enlightenmentnotion of the subjectbefore the
law. The belief that we can and must rid ourselves
of unruly desires before we can write responsibly
about others is not unlike the desire for an unmarkedposition that characterizesEnlightenment
discourses. Both presupposethe self-determining,
rationalsubjectof humanism.Abel's call for an alternative practice for feminist criticism assumes
that honest individuals,who are coherent,comprehending subjects, can give an honest account of
themselves (see Poovey, "Feminism"37, 42). For
Abel, as for Homansand Miller,the subjectin feminism is already there, constituted by her (white)
desires and exposing herself at every turn.
In Abel's and Homans's analyses, passing is
a charge to level against others, an illegitimate
subject position, or a practice to be consciously
avoided throughpersistent self-critique. Isolating
the categories of race and genderfrom other social
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determinants,as both women tend to do, does not
invalidate the insights provided by their analyses,
but it does mean that neither critic is capable of
analyzing the way in which passing originates in
the culturalproblematicthat Homans identifies as
a problemof race relationsin the academyand as a
consequenceof postmoderntheoryandculture.Suffering guilt over prior exclusionary practices and
anxiety aboutthe precariousnessof identityin postmodernculture,some white feminists seek comfort
in confessions thataim to reclaimthe subjectin the
name of those who in part have broughtabout the
crisis of identity in feminism and in the general
culture. Indeed, practicing self-critique as confessional seems to intensify white writers'tendencyto
use blacks "as a way of talking about and policing
matters of repression and meditations on ethics
and accountability"(Morrison7). For this reason,
Abel, who connects her criticalprojectwith Morrison's in Playing in the Dark, cannot avoid partici-

pating in the very practiceshe seeks to expose. Nor
can I or anyone else who is similarly positioned in
the academy.
Failing to account for the postmodern context
of her own analyses, Abel misses the point of her
call for thick descriptions of "a cultural economy
which constructs the feminine in the domain of
racial difference" (Wiegman 323). If white feminists, in Robyn Wiegman's words, tend "to circulate 'racial difference' as a commodity in our own
discourses,pastingover the white bourgeoiswoman
who occupies the center of our theoretical paradigms with images of black women whose historical and material specificity we thereby render
indecipherable"(as Abel and Homans argue),then
"the future of feminism depends on revealing the
inadequaciesof its most privilegedtheoreticalcategory"-women (326). This is the task of postmodern feminism, if postmodernismis understoodas a
historical and cultural imperative and not merely
as a theory of identity.
I have discussed this debate over the subject in
feminism at some length for two reasons. First, at
least insofar as it gives rise to efforts to expose the
passer and to a form of self-critiquethatentails policing identities, this debate can have the effect of
making students unwilling to risk themselves in
their writing (or, in Suleiman'sterms, to risk being

contemporary),thereby renderingthem incapable
of analyzing the import of postmodernismfor the
multiple subject positions that any person can inhabit and that make up the body politic (see Wicke
30; Harper,Framing90-91). This debatecan make
students feel they must get it right, say the right
things, make the right moves, and avoid revealing
too much of themselves. Yet, contradictorily,what
women's studies, African American studies, and
composition studies-as responses to the influx of
nontraditionalstudentsinto the academy-have historically sought to do is to allow more exposure of
the self in writing. As forms of critical pedagogy,
feminism and culture studies must resist efforts to
reclaim "a sovereign, self-aware consciousness at
the center of the composing act," in practice as
much as in theory, by shifting attention from the
individual writer to the scene of writing-to the
possibilities and constraints of the rhetorical and
cultural situation in which we find ourselves (see
Crowley 32-34, 46). For, and this is my second
point, as a politics of positioning (not a new theory
of identitybut a responseto the problemof identity
in postmodernculture), passing is an effect of the
institutionaland culturalrealitiesin which we teach
and write. As Amy Robinson argues, "In an academic milieu in which identityand identitypolitics
remain at the forefront of a battle over legitimate
critical and/orpolitical acts, the social practice of
passing offers a productive framework through
which to reimagine the contours of this debate"
(716). If culture studies is about nothing else, it is
aboutrevealingthe ways in which whatappearsnatural, given, is historicallyand culturallyproduced.
In structuringour writingand readingassignments,
we need to seize the opportunitiesfor passing that
the emergence of culture studies in the academy
has created.Culturestudiesmakespassingunavoidable, perhapsinevitable.
Class Notes: An Interlude
Womenhave rarelybeen composers.But we do have one
advantage.We'reused to performiing.
LaurieAnderson(qtd. in McClary)

In a writing-intensive core course on the Harlem
Renaissance, I showed the 1934 film Initation of
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Life, a melodrama based on a popular novel by Fannie Hurst and remade in 1959, and asked the students to respond in their journals to the relationship
between the two mothers in the film, Bea Pullman
and her live-in domestic, Delilah. One woman, who
asked me not to share her response with the class,
clearly expressed the anxieties that arise when a humanist concept of the subject comes into conflict
with a critical pedagogy:
I am not even really sure if this is supposedto be an
importantpartof the movie but it got me thinking.It's
the "friendship"betweenAunt D. andMiss B. The reason I am a bit confused is because I am not sure I am
supposedto take it at face value. Here is the way I saw
the friendship:I believe it was an honest to goodness
one. For example,when Aunt D. was worriedsince her
daughterdidn't come home after she received a letter
stating her daughterleft school, Miss B. wantedto go
with Aunt D. to help her find her. I saw Miss B. as
someone who cared a great deal for Aunt D. Miss B.
also let Peola know how disappointedshe was in her
by the way she was treatingher mother.
The confusion lies here. Being that this is a class
on African Americans,I am not sure if I am not looking, or should be looking for hiddenreasons (as far as
color goes). Because AuntD. did not move out andbuy
her own house after she came into some money, am I
to think this had anythingto do with color? See, I believe it does not. I myself am someone who enjoys
taking care of others. It has always been a partof my
nature. Did Aunt D. stay because this too was a part
of her natureor because since she was black she felt
she would not be in her "place"if she did not stay and
take care of Miss B. and her daughter?Perhaps this
was not a color issue. Just wondering.
The confusion, the hesitancy, the quotation marks
as qualifiers suggest that the student has learned
that "an honest to goodness" response is not to be
trusted, that what comes naturally to her may implicate her in racist language, if not racist social practices. But the language also reveals a strong desire to
believe in her natural self, to assure herself that her
desires belong to her and are "not a color issue."
In contrast, another woman, who was more than
willing to share her response, shows that she has
clearly learned the lesson of cultural criticism:
The characteristicsgiven to Delilah were many of
the same characteristicsattributedto the mammy ste-
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reotype.All of her tendencieswere describedas being
"natural."For example, Delilah said thatit was "natural"for her to raisechildren.This idea goes back to the
notion that mammieshave an overwhelmingmaternal
instinct.It was also interestingto see how Delilah was
made to be asexual or not involved in any sort of sexual relationship.Even thoughshe at least had one intimate encounter [because she has a child], there was
never any interestin her findinga man or love yet she
was continually encouraging Mrs. Pullman to fall in
love. In otherwords, Delilah's instinctswere maternal
not sexual.
It was interestingto see how they portrayedDelilah
as being the faithful servant. This stereotype, made
up by white America, helps defend the ideology that
African-Americansare perfectly satisfiedin their subservientposition. This is apparentwhen Mrs. Pullman
tells Delilah that she could stop workingand be fairly
well off but Delilah cannot bear the thought of not
taking care of Mrs. Pullman. We are to assume that
Delilah cannot live independentlyof a white person.
This was importantbecause it madethe audiencemore
comfortablewith the relationshipbetween Delilah and
Mrs. Pullman.This reassuredthem that Mrs. Pullman
was not takingadvantageof Delilah.
This woman displays no anxieties in part because
her position in relation to the material she is writing about is not an issue for her. The first woman
risks putting herself into the text, as students in
women's studies and African American studies are
often encouraged to do, and as a result feels like a
fraud. The second woman blows the cover, as it
were, on the first's comments, showing that those
"natural" responses are "ready-made reflections
which promise a false identity" (Lydon 248).
Yet however much these journal responses offer
conflicting ways of reading the place of the "natural" in our concepts of the subject, the two women
hold similar notions of themselves as writing subjects. The first wants desperately to believe in her
authenticity and her authority to speak; the second
simply assumes these. Indeed, although the second
has mastered better than the first the lesson of reading and writing as taught in critical pedagogy, it was
the first who came to change her notion of her self
as a subject through her writing in the course. For as
her rhetoric so painfully reveals, she had implicated
herself in what she had written and, as a result, had
undermined the authenticity of the I.
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I am not saying that the first studentwas the better readerbecause she put herself into the text. The
second read with more sophistication at this point
in the course. But I am saying that the first at least
came to experiencethroughthe act of writingitself
the kind of self-displacementthat so many writers
on criticalpedagogy advocate.In otherwords,there
is more than one way of getting it right, or wrong.
While intellectually and politically astute, the second student's argumentmakes no demandson her
subjectivity.While the firstreadersought,andfailed,
to suppressher whiteness, which emerged through
her writing as a category of analysis, the second
implicitly suggests through her response that she
can and must disavow her whiteness in analyzing
whiteness as a racializedidentity,therebyreinforcing the notion that knowing can be separatedfrom
experience.13
Changing the Subject
Now I'm loud.... Thisis why I usuallyget along withAfricanAmericans.I mean,whenwe're together,"Whooo!"
It's like Ifeel totally myself-we just let everythinggo!

CamillePaglia(qtd.in hooks,OutlawCulture)
Few white women have so repeatedly attracted
charges of passing as has Fannie Hurstover some
sixty years of criticism. What made Hurst'srepresentation of black women so controversial,sparking a lengthydebatein Opportunitymagazinein the
1930s, was that Hurstactively supportedblack artists, such as Zora Neale Hurston,her secretaryfor
a time. Through her 1933 novel Imitation of Life,
Hurstbroughtpolitically chargedissues of passing
and racism to wide public attention.The 1934 film
version of the novel was "one of the first screen
dramasthat linked issues of race, gender,and sexuality" (hooks, Yearning3-4). Yet the racist representations of Delilah (the mammy) and Peola (the
tragic mulatta)and the two characters'relationship
to Bea (the mistress)fosteredchargesthatHurstwas
a closet racist, that her identity as a liberal was a
fraud. Hurst did not help to dispel this view when
she respondedto SterlingBrown'sattackon the film
with the patronizingsuggestion that blacks should
be gratefulto her because the film "practicallyinaugurates into the importantmedium of the motion-

picture a considerationof the Negro as partof the
social pattern of American life" (Letter) or when
she wrote an editorialspeculatingon the notion "if
I were a Negro" ("SureWay").'4Not surprisingly,
Brown expressed no more gratitudefor the white
woman's efforts than does bell hooks for Paglia's
comment cited above: "Naturally,all black Americans were more than pleased to have Miss Camille
give us this vote of confidence, since we live to
make it possible for white girls like herself to have
a place where they can be totally themselves"(Outlaw Culture 84).

The controversy surroundingHurst shares with
current feminist debates the question of whether
white women write about black women to make
black women's experiences and desires known to
the white public or to become more comfortable
with their own racial and gender identity at a time
when many are anxious about the insecurity of
identity. Partly for this reason, I include Hurst's
novel and the 1934 film version in my African
American studies course on the Harlem Renaissance and in my women's studies course on the
construction of femininity in twentieth-century
Anglo-American culture. Written at a time of increasingconcernover the numbersof white women
enteringthe workforceand of black women leaving
domesticservice,especiallyas live-in help,the novel
expresses the kind of ambivalencethat attendssystemic social change. Workingthroughthe complex
relationsamongrace, gender,sexuality,and class in
this novel can be a disorientingexperience, as the
firststudent'sresponseto the film reveals,but it can
also providea way of coming to termswith presentday forms of passing. As in Nella Larsen's 1929
novel Passing, in Imitation of Life passing is the

site where the often competing narrativesof racial
and genderoppressionconvergewith sexuality.
On the one hand, the phenomenalbusiness success of Bea Pullman (who passes as "B. Pullman,
businessman"[124]) celebratesthe mother'sescape
from domesticity into "a market economy where
she can supposedlyown her own labor"(Wiegman
309). On the otherhand,the novel appealsto nostalgia for the security that the lost motherrepresents,
especially in the way Bea domesticatescommercial
space, fashioningher waffle houses as wombs, kennels, and safe havens (134, 149, 161, 235-36). At
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the same time that the novel appeals in the character of Delilah to "racialnostalgia"(Berlant122) for
the lost mammy,it gives Delilah some of the most
explicit comments on the operations of race and
racism in American society. But the novel's great
interestto me is that it makes clear (as the two film
versions do not) that at times of increased anxiety
over women's changing roles and identities, such
as Hurst's depression era or our postmodern moment, the need to returnwomen to the (maternal)
body becomes all the more urgent.
What is offbeat about Hurst's novel is that the
maternal,traditionallyassumedto be woman'snaturalrole, is exposed as a coverfor racismandsexism
in Americansociety precisely because the maternal
is linked with the inability to pass. Like the 1934
film, Hurst'snovel ostensibly suggests that racism
can be overcome if women band together on the
basis of their sharedcondition of motherhood.As
the second studentunderstood,this proposedbond
sentimentalizes racist social practices. But while
the film's sentimental ending invites such a reading, the novel explodes it.
In the novel, the maternalis revealed to inhibit
passing when we find out thatPeola, who passes as
white and marriesa white man, has had herself sterilized (a scene not in the films). To pass, she must
rejectthe possibility of motherhood(giving birthto
a dark-skinnedchild would expose her as a fraud),
just as she must demand that her dark-skinned
mother, Delilah, "unborn,"or disown, her own
child. One cannot pass as a mother.This lesson is
reinforcedat the end of the novel (not in the films)
when Bea, whose business success has been driven
by a desperate need for domestic security, is deprivedof the home she has spent a lifetime dreaming about, planning, building, and furnishing.The
home is now occupied by her daughter, who has
marriedthe only man Bea ever loved, her business
managereight years her junior, FrankFlake. This
cruel punishmentfor the workingmothermay make
the novel seem complicit with a patriarchalagenda,
but the interdependenceof the racial and maternal
discoursessuggests a differentreading.
Unlike both screen versions,where Peola returns
home at the end to throw herself on her mother's
coffin, the novel resists this nostalgiafor the imaginarymaternal.In the novel, Peola passes completely

in Bolivia with her white husband,and the focus at
Delilah's Harlem funeral is on Frank'sdiscomfort
in the presence of so many black people. "Didn't
know there were so many in the world," he says.
"Therecan't be any darkies left anywhere." "Except one,"the narratornotes in a parentheticalaside.
"In her white man's jungle" (329). This reference
to Peola (one of the few narrativeintrusionsin the
novel) remindsus that the plotlines of passing and
of the maternalarechiasmaticallylinked.Bea too is
living in the white man'sjungle, the world of business. Peola's disappearancefrom the novel leaves
open the possibility that she has successfully disruptedculturalidentitiesand identificationsand has
therebyelided the effects of race on social relationships andpersonalidentity,a possibilitythreatening
to a racialized society (and hence to Hollywood,
which must have Peola returnhome to reclaim her
racialidentity).But the subversivenessof the novel
actually turns on Peola's sterilization and the link
between passing and motherhood. For if Bea is
punished at the end and Peola is not, it is because
Bea has triedto pass as a mother.AlthoughPeola's
sterilization may imply that passing is unnatural,
that a black woman passing as white can never do
more than impersonate white womanhood, it also
allows female desire to be detachedfrom maternal
desire, suggesting that the cultural production of
femininitycan proceed apartfrom the reproduction
of motheringand of mammies and thereby undermine the "natural"basis of female identity(Poovey,
"Abortion"243), as well as the basis for female
bondingacross racialdifferences.
Hurstlets the black womanpass, which could, as
SterlingBrown charges,reinforcethe myth that all
blacks wantto be white.Yet the representationsthat
Brown uses to argue that Hurst's novel is racistand it is, in more ways thanBrown imagined-also
locate racismin the culturalproductionof femininity rootedin the maternal.The firststudentrevealed
the same connection, however unwittingly, when
notjust her whitenessbut her femalenessimplicated
her in a racialized identity: "I myself am someone
who enjoys takingcareof others.It has alwaysbeen
part of my nature .... Perhaps this was not a color

issue." Hurst's novel suggests that idealizing the
maternalis one way white patriarchalculture disavows the threatposed by passing women and that
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in the psychoanalytic narrativeof subjectivity,the
racializationof the maternalmay be morepervasive
than the occlusion of women within the symbolic
register.It is not a feminist project,Hurstsuggests,
to reclaimeitherthe maternalor the black woman's
body. You have to let it pass.
Let It Pass
LOUIS.I'm not racist. Well,maybeI am.
BELIZE.Oh, Louis, it's no fun picking on you; you're so

guilty.
Chicago productionof Angels in America

Writing on the film Imitation of Life, the first student experienced the precariousness of identity
that characterizesour postmodernmoment. In the
end, taking a position on the subject had less farreaching consequences for her writing than did
changing her own subject position, for her doubts
and hesitationsmeantthat she could no longer take
for grantedher self as referent.She learnedthrough
her writing that the subject position from which
one speaks and writes is never secure. Having no
secure position to which to returnis precisely what
distinguishespassing without the as from passing
as. Coming to terms with the precariousness of
one's own identityopens up the possibility of passing, or, in Toni Morrison's words, of "becoming,"
the "processof enteringwhatone is estrangedfrom"
(4)-which may not be those labeled other but the
self that one has long thoughtone's own. Through
her halting efforts to come to terms with gender
identity as racially inflected, the first studentcame
to work through(in both senses of that phrase)her
own identificationsin a way thatthe second woman,
however savvy her response, was never able to do
in her writing. The second woman found a secure
positionfromwhich to write;the firstwrotethrough
some precariouspositions, a performativeprocess
thatprovidedan experienceof subjectivityas passing that the second woman's discourse rhetorically
suppressed.
The point of all this for the teachingof literature
is that we need to provide our studentswith strategies and occasions for workingthroughratherthan
taking up-taking a stand on-subject positions.
Such opportunitiesare especially importantwhen-

ever we make whitenessvisible as a racialcategory,
available for critique and open to delegitimation;
whenever we reconceive concepts of essence and
experiencein the aftermathof poststructuralisttheories; and wheneverwe engage the politics of idenThe
tity in postmodernityandin culturalcriticism.15
double bind created by the discrepancy between
what we profess and how we are positioned, between the demands of a critical pedagogy and the
constraints of postmodern culture, cannot be resolved only in theory but must also be confronted
performativelyin the literatureclassroom.My readings of the critical essays, the student responses,
and the novel are intendedto alert us to those moments when passingis happeningin our classrooms
and our writing so that we can exploit the analytical, political, and ethical possibilities it creates.
It is not thatI wouldrejectself-critiqueby whites
writing on race or men writing on feminism. On
the contrary.But I would argue that self-critique
can be effective only when we do not attemptto reclaim the body, to revive the humanist subject, or
to find appropriatefigures for postmodernsubjectivity. Self-critique without a postmodernisteffort
to free concepts of identityfrom theirmetaphysical
foundationsleaves only a choice between the confessional and the fraudulent. The problem is not
self-critique:it is rather,as Mary Poovey writes in
anothercontext ("Feminism,"esp. 38), thatthe humanist subject continues to be producedas a solution to the cultural problematic that places us all
in the position of passing. The more passing becomes the possibilityopenedup by ourinterrogation
of subjectpositions, the more, it seems, we defend
ourselvesagainstit by makingit unnaturalor illegitimate. Such a culturalproblematic,however,cannot be elided by any I seeking a more authentic
position. We cannot get out of passing by attempting to reclaim the subject, the body, or the real
thing. We have to let it pass.

Notes
I wish to thank the following friends and colleagues for their
helpful commentson this essay: Anne Callahan,Susan Cavallo,
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Judy Massey Dozier, Susan Jarratt,EleanorHonig Skoller, Isaiah Smithson, and Lynn Worsham.Thanks also go to Michele
Troy for her editorialassistance and to Danielle Glassmeyerfor
her researchon Hurst.
I borrowthe term culturestudies from IsaiahSmithson,who
attributesit to GayatriSpivak. As opposed to cultural studies,
culturestudies designates less a distinct methodology and critical traditionthan the state of the humanitiesin the aftermathof
the theoreticaland social upheavalsof the past two decades. See
Smithson for a brief but detailed definition of culture studies. I
use cultural critics to refer not just to practitionersof cultural
studies and to critics of popularculturebut also to scholarsand
teachers whose object of study is the effect, not the origin, of
representationsand discourses and who see their task as one of
"interrogatingculturalphenomenaratherthan elucidating literary masterpieces"(Smithson 1).
Originally I intended the subtitle of my essay to allude to a
1985 paperby Nancy K. Miller,"Changingthe Subject:Authorship, Writing,and the Reader"(ch. 5 in her Subjectto Change),
which arguesthat a poststructuralistconcept of the subjectdoes
not work for women. But I have since found this phrasein other
relevantworks. Changingthe Subjectis a 1984 collection of essays that integratespsychoanalytictheories of subjectivitywith
a Foucauldianconcernfor the social discoursesand technologies
that regulatesubjectivity(Henriqueset al.). In "Onthe Subjects
of Class and Genderin 'The LiteracyLetters,'"Linda Brodkey
uses the phraseas the subtitle of a section on postmoderntheories of subjectivity.Gayle Greene and Coppelia Kahn gave the
title ChangingSubjects:The Makingof FeministLiteraryCriticisml to a 1993 collection they edited, which historicizes and
theorizes the personalto reclaim for feminists the legitimacy of
saying "I"and "we." "Changingthe subject"seems to be a defining tropefor feminism in the wake of poststructuralism.
-In my text, I use the first-personpluralpronounethically, to
implicate my readers in a cultural problematic that requires a
shared structureof response. I differentiate between the we of
performativeengagement and the we of disembodied truth.In
a performativepractice, we refers not to discrete identities that
exist beforeengagementwith othersbutto identitiesbroughtinto
being throughengagement.While feminist and African American critics have rightly questioned the imperial we in writing
thattakes white male experience as the norm,now critics by no
means marginalizedcan mobilize that resistance to the use of
we in theirown interests,to escape theirimplicationin the structuraldynamicsthat I call passing. But the issue is more complicatedeven thanthat.It wouldbe too easy to distinguishabsolutely
betweenthe imperialwe and the performativewve;such a distinction ignores the inevitable slippage between the two, which is
the subjectof this article.
3On the issue of who can speak in the classroom, see, e.g.,
Fuss, Speaking,esp. the last chapter,"Essentialismin the Classroom";hooks, Teaching,esp. the critique of Fuss in ch. 6, and
Yearninlg.

4"Postmodernculture"is a shorthandto refer to a numberof
social, cultural, economic, and technological changes over the
past three decades that have converged to alter profoundlyour
experienceof and our thinkingaboutidentityin Westernculture.

These changes are registered,in Poovey's words, "as challenges
to the most basic units of humanist understanding-the individuality of the subject and the bodily integrity of the person"
("Feminism"39).
50n the characterizationof passing as betrayalin classic passing texts, see V. Smith.
6Tryingto mediatebetween humanism'sautonomoussubject
and poststructuralism's
depersonalizedsubject,Alcoff's concept
of positionalitydefines the subjectby social location and historical experiencesratherthan by essential attributes.Positionality
conceives the subject'sposition as "a place from where meaning
is constructed,ratherthansimply the place where a meaningcan
be discovered(the meaningof femaleness)"("Feminism"434).
7My critique of argumentslike Alcoff's that are based on a
notion of positionalityis meantnot to deny that subjectsare positioned but to undercutthe idea that one acts from a fixed or
priorposition. The kind of self-critiqueAlcoff advocates,where
one identifies oneself by race, gender,sexuality,class, age, and
so on, before speaking, assumes that the subject is positioned
before speaking. In a performativeview, the subject is brought
into being throughthe engagementwith others.JudithButler in
"Fora CarefulReading"and Phillip BrianHarperin "'The Subversive Edge"' correct common misreadingsof performativity
thatassume a subjectacts voluntarily,takingon a certainsubjectivity as if playing a role. This voluntaristicI is not the subject
that informsmy conceptionof passing.
8As Susan David Bernstein says, "Any rhetorical posture,
whether in an article or in the classroom, is already mediated,
compromisedby desires, by forces of languageand culture,that
cannot be grasped together by any one 'I.'" The subject is not
reducedto its linguistic performance,she adds, but "thedimensions of language structure the representation of any epistemological claims about an 'I"' (127, 142). Alcoff tries both to
acknowledgeand, in the interestsof a coalition politics, to obviate the truthof this deconstructionof the I. In contrast,my passing is an effort to work through the radical implications of
Derrida'spractice, as do JudithButler (Bodies and "Reading")
andDrucillaCornell(AccommodationandPhilosophy).Whereas
coalitionpolitics makesthe erroneousassumptionthatto surrender categoriesof identityis to surrenderpolitics, Butler seeks to
articulatea politics that is not tied to identity categories. In the
dynamics of passing, one cannot worry about being exposed as
eitherthe real thing or a fraud,for passing contaminatesthe distinction between the two. Passing delimits positionality but in
doing so no more abandonsthe notion of position thanDerrida's
"iterability"-the principlethat any sign is necessarilya repetition or citation,which limits intentionality'srole in the determinationof meaning-abandons the categoryof intentionality.
9The psychological no less than the political is historical
(Willis 320). Susan StandfordFriedmanuses the term "psycho/
political dynamics" in an essay that attempts to negotiate between poststructuralistand nonpoststructuralistfeminisms, especially betweentheirconflictingnotions of the subject(474).
1?Iargue in the introductionto my book Passing and Pedagogy thatmany performanceartistsget it right-that is, they understandthe performativityof subjectivitythat academics may
concede in theorybut often forget in practice.
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1The term critical
pedagogy, referringto activist teaching in
general, designates a practice that necessarily concerns itself
with questions of subjectivity and agency in postmodern culture. See, for example, Aronowitz and Giroux 117-18; Giroux;
George and Shoos 201-02; Jarratt107-17. My reading of Homans and Abel, like their readings of feminists, seeks to understand the complex and contradictory positions writers and
teachersinhabitin culturalcriticism and in postmodernculture.
I write on these essays not to refute them but to discover by
working throughthem what I can say and do, what positions I
can and cannotassume as a feminist critic and teacher.
'2Pooveyanalyzes variousdefenses againstthe pervasivefear
that the nature of the human is at risk in postmodern culture
("Feminism"35-36). I borrowfrom her descriptionto account
for how postmodernist feminist theory prompts defensive responses in some feminists afraidthat it eliminates the body. On
the notion of identity at risk in postmodernculture,see Poovey,
"Feminism";Butler,Bodies and "Imitation";and Wicke.
3Onthis notion, see Harding.
14Hurstpassed in other ways. To experience lives she wrote
about, she would engage in impersonation.Once she took a job
as a shopgirl in her father's factory so that she could portray
such a lifestyle in a novel. To create a place for her, Hurst'sfatherfiredthe real thing. This example should be enough to warn
us against the dangers of overgeneralizing about the ethics of
passing. "There is passing and then there is passing" (Butler,
Bodies 130).
15Onthe problems that can arise in the classroom whenever
we interrogate whiteness and other racialized identities, see
Keating, especially her observationthat studentsoften conflate
representationsof whiteness with white people.
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